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Abstract
We experimentally investigate the effect of time pressure from deadlines in a rich-
context bargaining game with an induced reference point at the 2/3-1/3 distribution. 
Our results show that first proposals, concessions, and settlements are very similar 
for different time-pressure levels. Nevertheless, time pressure systematically influ-
ences the type of agreements reached: the likelihood of bargainers reaching agree-
ments on the equal split is lower under time pressure. Furthermore, disagreements 
and last-moment-agreements (conditional on reaching an agreement) are more fre-
quently observed under time pressure, though the effect on last-moment agreements 
disappears when disagreements are included in the analysis. Finally, the effect of 
time-pressure on the frequency of disagreements is stronger for those pairs with 
higher tension in first proposals.
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1 Introduction
Whether it is wage negotiations, climate negotiations, political negotiations on dis-
armament deals or contract negotiations in general—a common feature is (often 
severe) time pressure toward the deadline for striking a deal in bargaining. Last-
minute deals in international negotiations or in wage bargaining happen frequently. 
Debt ceilings such as the ones for the U.S. government or similar inherent deadlines 
create time pressure for negotiators that are involved in political deal making. In 
sports, registration deadlines for competitions such as the UEFA Champions League 
require teams to strike a deal on player sign-ups before a specified deadline, with 
very severe consequences if the deadline is missed. Despite the obvious relevance 
of deadlines and time pressure in bargaining, the theoretical investigation of time 
as a variable does often not lead very far, as equilibria in most frequently used bar-
gaining models are implemented instantaneously. This is, for instance, true for the 
Nash bargaining game (Nash 1953), alternating offers bargaining game (Rubinstein 
1982), and many versions of war of attrition games (Bulow and Klemperer 1999).1 
However, for practical bargaining problems, the timing of offers and deadlines play 
a central role in bargaining strategies and outcomes. As a consequence of the instan-
taneous nature of the equilibrium prediction, or the intricacies of full-fledged theo-
retical models taking timing into account, economists have mostly neglected issues 
of time pressure and deadlines in empirical assessments of bargaining.2
This paper provides empirical insights based on an experiment in a rich bargain-
ing context (Gächter and Riedl 2005; Karagözoğlu and Riedl 2015; Bolton and 
Karagözoğlu 2016; Camerer et al. 2017) that yet has enough structure to rigorously 
control for important aspects in bargaining. It extends the scarce existing evidence 
on the effects of deadlines from simple and highly structured bargaining games such 
as the ultimatum game (Sutter et al. 2003; Cappelletti et al. 2011) to a more realis-
tic environment that allows for taking strategic timing decisions of offers and other 
bargaining parameters explicitly into account. We implement time pressure resulting 
from a binding and known deadline.3 Failure to complete tasks or reach agreements 
on time and the mistakes/bad decisions made under deadline pressure can have 
important economic consequences. Thus, for economists, it is relevant to understand 
the dynamics of bargaining with deadlines and time pressure. It may ultimately lead 
to richer models of bargaining considering time, timing, and psychological aspects 
of time as explicit variables.
Our setup builds on the setup of Roth et  al. (1988) and more recent experi-
ments by Gächter and Riedl (2005) as well as, for instance, Karagözoğlu and 
1 The Nash bargaining game is a one-shot, simultaneous move game. Hence, the immediate agreement 
result is trivially valid. That said, the same result is valid in various modified versions of it where a sec-
ond stage is introduced (see Brams and Taylor 1994; Cetemen and Karagözoğlu 2014).
2 Fershtman and Seidmann (1993), Ma and Manove (1993), Ponsati (1995), Damiano et  al. (2012), 
Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2013), Şimşek and Yıldız (2014), Fanning (2016) and Karagözoğlu and Keskin 
(2018) are some papers that study the deadline effect/delay in bargaining and issues associated with it.
3 Obviously, other forms of time pressure are possible and interesting as an alternative setup. A promi-
nent alternative utilized by experimental economists is to have a shrinking pie.
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Riedl (2015). The bargaining task is to allocate a salary budget of size X ∈ {x, 
x̄ } with x < x̄ . A real effort task before the negotiations accompanied by a story 
frame in the experimental instructions creates reference point outcomes  yi and  yj 
for the two negotiators i and j. We implement  yi  > yj, and x < yi + yj < x̄ . The lat-
ter condition mplies that implementing the reference levels is feasible with the 
larger budget but infeasible with the smaller budget. There is a possible second, 
implicit reference point in such environments: the equal split. The negotiation 
outcome is an allocation tuple {zi,  zj} with  zi +  zj = X, or disagreement, result-
ing in the allocation {0, 0} if the two bargainers do not agree.
Our experiment uses an unstructured bargaining protocol, which allows the 
sequence and the timing of offers to be endogenously determined. As summa-
rized by Camerer et  al. (2017), (1) the unstructured bargaining protocol offers 
the researcher much richer data – especially on the negotiation process – than 
the structured alternatives, (2) it is more realistic than those, and (3) structured 
theoretical predictions can still be obtained. Our main treatment variable in this 
setup is the time allotted to bargainers for reaching an agreement. In our low 
time pressure treatment (LTP), the bargainers are given a 10-min deadline, and 
in our high time pressure treatment (HTP), they are given a 90-s deadline. Fur-
ther, we collected data for a 45-s deadline (SHTP: severely high time pressure) 
as a robustness check. Bargaining takes place anonymously in pairs through a 
real-time chat on the screen. Subjects bargain only once.
We observe a significant and sizeable increase in disagreement rates with 
high time pressure, and even more so with severely high time pressure. The dis-
agreement rate rises from 4.5% under low time pressure to 31.4% under high 
time pressure (and to 38.1% under severely high time pressure), implying a very 
high level of inefficiency. In contrast to the results in many existing studies on 
structured bargaining, for which disagreement under time pressure is rare, the 
rich context with subjective entitlements and competing reference points seems 
to contribute to problems in reaching an agreement. The number of offers and 
counter-offers in our experiment indicate that it is not the physical limitations of 
time pressure that lead to the high numbers of disagreement. Even under severe 
time pressure, bargainers make several offers and counter-offers, but agreements 
often take place much closer to the deadline. Our data indicate that the time 
pressure has more explanatory power when explaining disagreements for those 
pairs with a larger difference in their first proposals. This observation can—at 
least partially—explain the much higher disagreement rate. It seems as if more 
distant initial proposals, and thus a higher level of initial conflict, can still be 
compensated for in negotiations with a looser deadline; but with a tight dead-
line and thus time pressure, the situation may lead to an impasse more easily. 
Interestingly, there are only small differences in the nature of the agreements (if 
reached) across the time pressure conditions. We observe a lower likelihood of 
implementing the implicit reference point (i.e., the 50–50 split) in agreements 
under high time pressure than under low time pressure. All other variables (e.g., 
first proposals, concessions) are identical in the two conditions.
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2  Literature review
While there is a quickly growing literature on the relationship between response 
times and decisions in (experimental) economics, including papers that explicitly 
take time pressure into account (Spiliopoulos and Ortmann 2014), there is virtu-
ally no tradition of economic bargaining experiments including a variation of the 
deadline for reaching an agreement. In negotiation science, in management, and 
in social psychology, in contrast, the literature on time and timing in bargaining 
is fairly large (see Lim and Murnighan 1994; Mosterd and Rutte 2000; De Dreu 
2003; Moore 2004; Gino and Moore 2008; among others). Many of the studies 
in other disciplines, however, lack theoretical benchmarks, making it difficult to 
control for the (causal) effects of specific bargaining parameters. They often do 
not use salient incentives. Finally, some of these studies use integrative (non-con-
stant sum) bargaining as opposed to distributive bargaining. For those reasons, 
we focus mainly on contributions from the economics literature.
Stuhlmacher et  al. (1998) provide a meta-analysis of experimental studies 
on time pressure in bargaining. They show that the overall effects of time pres-
sure depend on characteristics of the bargaining interaction such as the incen-
tives given or the number of issues to be dealt with. However, the majority of the 
surveyed papers show an increase in concession-making and cooperation with a 
higher level of time pressure. A similar conclusion is drawn in an earlier meta-
study on bargaining experiments in which time pressure is only one of several 
considered dimensions (Druckman 1994). However, Carnevale and Lawler (1986) 
as well as Mosterd and Rutte (2000) provide evidence that time pressure reduces 
the frequency of reaching agreements in bilateral negotiations in which bargain-
ing parties can make offers and counter-offers. The dynamics in multi-faceted 
bargaining processes can be complex. Harinck and De Dreu (2004), for instance, 
report results showing that individuals might get locked into early impasses more 
often under low than under high time pressure.
Interestingly, the economics literature on time pressure in bargaining experi-
ments, which is very small, goes to the other extreme. Sutter et al. (2003) experi-
mentally investigate the impact of time pressure on proposer and responder behavior 
in a standard ultimatum game and observe that under time pressure responders reject 
about 60% of offers, whereas without time pressure responders reject only 20% of 
offers. Controlling for offers, rejection rates of responders are significantly higher 
under a tight than under a very weak time constraint. However, this effect vanishes 
in repeated one-shot play. Güth et al. (2005) look at deadlines in multi-period bar-
gaining with constant and decreasing pie sizes. They show that a decrease in the pie 
size and alternating roles in repeated bargaining lead to earlier agreements, i.e. they 
attenuate the deadline effect. Cappelletti et al. (2011) investigate how proposers in 
the ultimatum game behave when their cognitive resources are constrained by time 
pressure and cognitive load. Time pressure leads to a slight increase in offers, but 
the effect is only significant in one condition (with high endowments). Cognitive 
load does not seem to have a systematic effect on offers. Finally, Alberti et al. (2017) 
show that longer horizons lead to more disagreements due to reduced concessions.
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3  Experimental design and hypotheses
3.1  Experimental design
We modify the experimental design introduced in Gächter and Riedl (2005) (and 
later used in several versions in Karagözoğlu and Riedl 2015; Gächter et al. 2015; 
Bolton and Karagözoğlu 2016) for our purpose. In this setup, randomly and anony-
mously paired subjects take on the role of department heads in a hypothetical com-
pany. They learn in the instructions (see the Online Appendix for details) that in the 
past, the top management of the company have distributed the salary budget based 
on the (relative) performances of two department heads. Now, due to exogenous, 
stochastic economic fluctuations, the available salary budget increases/decreases 
and the top management changes its policy. The two department heads will have to 
negotiate an allocation of the available budget among them, after performing a task.
The design (see Table 1 for an overview) induces an explicit reference point: we 
tell the bargainers that the top management of the hypothetical company they are 
working for paid the higher performing department head 14,000 points and the lower 
performing department head 7000 (when the salary budget was 21,000), although 
the current circumstances are somewhat different than the past. This implies a 2/3-
1/3 division backed up by earned status. Yet, there is possibly a second, implicit 
reference/focal point: in such environments low performers usually resort to the 1/2-
1/2 division, which can be backed up by (1) equality, (2) the fact that performances 
did not affect the size of the surplus to be shared, (3) the argument that the relevance 
of the asymmetric precedent is ambiguous. This setup has been shown to be suc-
cessful in studying the influence of reference points implemented by precedents and 
subjective entitlements on bargaining behavior.
We vary the time available to the bargainers for reaching an agreement as a 
between-subject treatment variable. In our low time pressure treatment (LTP), the 
bargainers are given 10 min, and in our high time pressure treatment (HTP), they are 
given 90 s. Further, we collected additional data with a 45 s deadline for bargaining 
(SHTP: severely high time pressure) to check for robustness of results.4 We also 
Table 1  Sequence of events 1. Reading instructions aloud
2. Performance task
3. Elicitation of beliefs on performance
4. Relative performance information
5. Budget size allocated to pairs
6. Subjective entitlements
7. Bargaining
8. Post-experimental questionnaire
4 In the following, we will mainly focus on HTP and LTP. The findings from SHTP are very similar to 
those from HTP, and hence discussed separately in Online Appendix A.4.
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(randomly) vary the salary budget in the experiment (to make historical claims fea-
sible or infeasible) as an exogenous treatment variable, which can be thought of as 
another robustness check of the results. While we were not interested in the effects 
of increases or decreases of the available budget per se (the design feature was 
implemented to allow direct comparisons with the existing literature), we control 
for their effects in the analysis. The budget size variation is implemented randomly 
within a given session. For practical reasons we conduct separate sessions for the 
different time pressure treatments.
3.1.1  Performance task
After distributing instructions on paper, reading them aloud, and answering ques-
tions in private, bargainers’ performances are measured using a general knowledge 
quiz. The quiz consists of 50 multiple choice questions from various fields of knowl-
edge. For each of these trivia questions there are five answer choices, and only one 
is correct (unanswered questions count as incorrect). Each participant receives the 
same set of questions in the same order and has 25 s to answer each question. All of 
this is made common knowledge among participants.
3.1.2  Elicitation of beliefs on performances
Since our subjects do not receive a precise information on the number of their (and 
others’) correct answers, their entitlements (or fairness judgments) can be correlated 
with their beliefs on their relative performance in the task. Hence, we ask each sub-
ject to report her prediction on her own number of correct answers as well as her 
prediction on the number of correct answers of the other department head. These 
questions are incentivized using a linear scheme: for each perfect match between the 
guess and the actual performance, a subject earns 250 points. For each prediction 
with a deviation of 1(2) questions from the actual performance, a subject earns 125 
(62.5) points; predictions with larger deviations do not receive any points. Subjects 
are informed about their earnings from this stage (i.e. the precision of their predic-
tions) at the end of the experiment. For obvious reasons, the linear scheme is not 
perfect, but for our purpose it is sufficient.
3.1.3  Relative performance information
Once the real effort task is completed and beliefs are elicited, everybody is told who 
in their pairs was the ‘high performer’ and who the ‘low performer’, depending on 
the number of correct answers in the general knowledge quiz. In case of a tie, the 
one in the randomly assembled pairs who spent less time in answering questions 
becomes the high performer. If both subjects answered the same number of ques-
tions correctly and the time they spent in answering these questions was also identi-
cal, high and low performer roles are assigned randomly. If this possibility had real-
ized, the pair would have been informed about it. Following the provision of relative 
performance information, subjects are reminded of the salary distribution when the 
salary budget was 21,000 points.
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3.1.4  Budget size
We randomly generate two budget values X ∈ {x, x̄ }, one lower (15,000) than the 
status quo value of  21,000 and the other higher (27,000). For the first, historical 
claims (i.e. 14,000 and 7,000) are not jointly feasible, whereas for the second they 
are. We can check whether the influence of time pressure (if any) on bargaining dif-
fers across these two conditions that capture differently challenging bargaining situ-
ations. To determine whether a pair will negotiate over an increased or decreased 
budget, a six-sided die is rolled. It is emphasized in the instructions that (1) the 
budget determination is a purely random process, (2) each side of the die has an 
appearance probability of 1/6, and (3) the final outcome has nothing to do with the 
performances in the task. If a pair received a 1, 2 or 3 from the die roll, this implies 
bad economic conditions and a reduced salary budget of 15,000 points. Likewise, if 
a pair has a 4, 5 or 6 from the die roll, it implies good economic conditions and an 
increased salary budget of 27,000 points.
3.1.5  Subjective entitlements
We measure subjects’ (potentially existing) subjective entitlements with a question, 
adapted from Babcock et al. (1995): “According to your opinion, what would be a 
fair distribution of the salary budget from the vantage point of a non-involved, neu-
tral arbitrator?” Subjects are not informed about this question beforehand, and they 
know about their relative performances before they answer this question.
3.1.6  Bargaining
Bargaining is anonymous and unstructured in the experiment. Unstructured bargain-
ing avoids exogenous first-mover effects and gives subjects as much bargaining free-
dom as possible (e.g., in the timing, sequence, number of proposals, communication 
used, etc.). In addition, it provides a rich data set on multiple layers of bargaining, 
which allows us to understand the effects of our experimental manipulation not only 
on outcomes, but also on the process of negotiations. This is particularly appealing 
for the study of time pressure in bargaining. Subjects exchange proposals that con-
sist of an amount for themselves and an amount for the other department head. For 
convenience, sending inefficient proposals is not allowed (if the sum of the amounts 
a subject proposes is less than the total budget available, a warning message appears 
on the screen). An agreement is reached if one of the subjects accepts (by pressing 
an accept button on his/her screen) the other’s standing proposal before the deadline. 
Subjects can also exchange verbal messages. A subject can send one verbal message 
(of unlimited length) per proposal (so that there is no confusion about which pro-
posal is being discussed). Depending on the treatment, bargaining pairs have either 
10 min (LTP: low time pressure) or 90 s (HTP: high time pressure). If subjects in 
a pair reach an agreement within the allotted time, their payoffs are implemented 
accordingly. If they do not, each subject in the pair earns zero points. Importantly, 
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subjects receive the instructions about bargaining after performing the knowledge 
quiz and answering the fairness question. Each subject plays the bargaining game 
only once.
3.1.7  Post‑experimental questionnaire and payments
After the experiment, subjects are asked to report (1) their satisfaction about the 
bargaining outcome, (2) their opinion about the legitimacy of the quiz as a measure 
of general knowledge, and (3) their perceptions on the difficulty of the quiz (all on 
7-point Likert scales). They are also asked to fill in justice centrality and belief-
in-a-just-world questionnaires (Dalbert et al. 1987), a ten-item big-five personality 
questionnaire (Gosling et al. 2003), and a risk attitude questionnaire (Dohmen et al. 
2011). Finally, subjects answer a few questions about their personal background 
(e.g., age, gender, field of study, monthly disposable income, etc.). Subjects were 
paid their earnings in private once everyone had finished the questionnaire part. 
Earnings were rounded at the end of the session (i.e., after summing up all earnings 
from predictions and bargaining stages).
The experiment was programmed with z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). We conducted 
the experimental sessions at Bilkent University throughout 2014 and 2015.5 In total, 
360 students from various backgrounds with an average age of 21.3 participated in 
the experiment. A typical session lasted about 50–60 min, depending on the treat-
ment; leaving early when finished with bargaining quickly was not possible. Sub-
jects’ total earnings were converted into cash with an exchange rate of 100 points 
equal to 40 Turkish Lira Cents. The average earning per subject was approximately 
40 Turkish Lira (including a show-up fee of 5 Turkish Lira), which corresponds to 
the total amount a student would pay for seven days of lunch at the student cafeteria.
3.2  Research hypotheses
3.2.1  Frequency of (dis)agreements
Some earlier research on time pressure effects on bargaining showed that high time 
pressure induces lower resistance to conceding (see Roth et al. 1988; Lim and Mur-
nighan 1994; De Dreu et al. 2000). This is due to the proximity to a deadline, mak-
ing reaching an agreement more urgent. Hence, individuals under high time pres-
sure might care less about their own position and are more willing to compromise. 
On the other hand, individuals under low time pressure care a lot about their own 
position or outcomes and are unwilling to concede to the other party (Druckman 
1994). We think that there are also good arguments in favor of the opposite hypothe-
sis–especially in the current setup. Given the presence of conflicting reference/focal 
points (and if the initial tension is identical across treatments), it could become more 
difficult to reach an agreement (see also Yukl et  al. 1976; Carnevale and Lawler 
5 The LTP data used here is also used in Gächter et al. (2015).
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1986; Mosterd and Rutte 2000). It is also likely that tension in first proposals will be 
more influential for the likelihood of disagreements under severe time pressure. We 
predict that in HTP, we observe more frequent disagreements (see also Roth et al. 
1988).
Hypothesis 1 The frequency of disagreements is higher in HTP than in LTP.
3.2.2  Content of agreements
In our experiment, there are two potential reference/focal points. The 2/3-1/3 divi-
sion is the one explicitly induced by the experimental design, and the 1/2-1/2 divi-
sion is the one implicitly present due to vagueness of the reasons in favor of 2/3-1/3 
and due to the equality norm. It has been pointed out in the literature that individuals 
often rely on cognitive heuristics, which could have evolved with the objective of 
increasing efficiency and speed while they may decrease accuracy and quality (Baz-
erman and Neale 1983; Carnevale and Pruitt 1992). We stipulate that greater time 
pressure increases the need for straightforwardly available coordinating devices and 
reliance on focal/reference points. The induced reference point, the 2/3-1/3 distri-
bution—being more favorable to high performers—can act as such a coordinating 
device. The implicit reference point, the 1/2-1/2 distribution—being relatively more 
favorable to low performers—can also act as a coordinating device. However, the 
former has the advantage of explicitness and salience induced by our design. We 
predict that (due to the greater salience of the 2/3-1/3 distribution as a reference 
point or focal point) time pressure favors high performers.
Hypothesis 2 2/3-1/3 agreements are more likely in HTP than in LTP, and 1/2-1/2 
agreements are less likely in HTP than in LTP, both conditional on an agreement 
being reached.
Hypothesis 3 Average agreed shares of high performers are larger in HTP than in 
LTP.
3.2.3  Timing of agreements
For reasons similar to the ones discussed above (for disagreements), we hypothesize 
that time pressure will increase the frequency of last-moment agreements. In other 
words, the deadline effect will be more pronounced in HTP.
Hypothesis 4 The frequency of last-moment agreements is higher in HTP than in 
LTP.
A point worthwhile mentioning is that a higher level of time pressure itself 
does not necessarily imply more frequent last-moment agreements. It could simply 
change the way bargainers perceive risks associated with breakdown and lead them 
to rush for deals. We do not provide a hypothesis for the stake-size variation (i.e., 
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the increase or decrease in budget and the subsequent feasibility or infeasibility of 
historical claims according to the story in our experimental instructions), because 
it was not a variable of interest to us.6 Nonetheless, we report results regarding this 
variable in the results section and the Online Appendix.
4  Experimental results
Whenever we have a one-sided hypothesis, we use one-sided test statistics. When 
comparing means across treatments, we use Mann–Whitney-U (MW) tests, and 
in comparing distributions of variables, we use Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) tests. 
When comparing ratios (or percentages), we use both Pearson’s Chi square and 
Fisher’s exact tests. For reasons of convenience, we label high performing depart-
ment heads as “winners” and low performing department heads as “losers”. Fair-
ness judgments, first proposals, and agreements are all given in shares to winners.7 
We defer non-parametric tests related to differences in bargaining behavior (or out-
comes) across different stake sizes to the Online Appendix (see Online Appendix 
A.3, Table A.3.5). Those results show that the main outcome variables of bargaining 
are not systematically influenced by the variation in the stake size. Hence, in con-
ducting the non-parametric tests below, we pool data from the two stake sizes.8
For every regression analysis, we present four specifications: (1) only the main 
variables of interest as independent variables (Specification 1), (2) Specification 
1 + control variables (Specification 2), (3) Specification 1 + interaction variables 
(Specification 3), and (4) Specification 3 + control variables (Specification 4). Con-
trol variables are subjects’ justice centrality scores, agreeableness scores, risk atti-
tudes, gender composition of the pair, and the budget level dummy (1 for the higher 
budget). In the following, we provide the estimates for our main variables of interest. 
Detailed regression tables are provided in Online Appendix A.3, and we report mar-
ginal treatment effects from our regressions in Table A.3.6.9
4.1  Frequency of (dis)agreements
Table 2 shows the distribution of disagreements in our treatments. We observe that 
4 pairs (out of 89; 4.5%) disagreed in LTP, and 22 pairs (out of 70; 31.4%) disagreed 
in HTP. Both tests show that the difference is highly significant (for both, p < 0.001), 
strongly in line with Hypothesis 1.
7 For instance, if a loser asks for 55% of the pie in his first proposal, this implies that he offers 45% to 
the winner. Hence, the variable “shares to winner” is given as 45%. Similarly, if a loser believes that he 
deserves 48% of the pie, we present it in shares to the winner, i.e., as 52%.
8 In contrast, stake size is explicitly controlled for in the regression analyses. In the regression analysis 
the stake size variation has an influence on two bargaining markers: higher stake is associated with less 
frequent 2/3-1/3 agreements and more frequent last-moment agreements.
9 In Sect. 4.3, we also present auxiliary results on the bargaining process.
6 See footenote 5. Gächter et al. (2015) study the effects of the stake-size variation.
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Table 3 presents the results of (robust) probit regressions investigating the effects 
of time pressure (T_pressure), tension in first proposals (the difference in first pro-
posals; Diff_first), and the interaction between the two variables on the probabil-
ity of disagreements.10 In all specifications, the time pressure coefficient has the 
expected positive sign, and it is significant, except for Specification 3. The interac-
tion of time pressure and the tension in first proposals has the expected positive sign. 
We interpret this result as follows: for those pairs with high levels of tension in first 
proposals, the effect of time pressure on the likelihood of a disagreement is seems to 
be stronger, but the evidence is not fully conclusive.
Notice that there are only four disagreements in LTP (out of 89 pairs), and probit 
models can become unstable if the binary dependent variable takes one of the two 
values only very infrequently. Therefore, as a further sensitivity analysis, we also 
run an exact logistic regression with time pressure, a binary variable describing the 
tension in first proposals, and an interaction of these two as explanatory variables 
(see Table A.2.3 in the Online Appendix).11 An exact logistic regression is recom-
mended when the sample size is very small and/or when some of the cells formed 
Table 2  Disagreements and 
time pressure Disagreements LTP HTP Total
0 85 48 133
1 4 22 26
Total 89 70 159
Table 3  Disagreements and time pressure (robust probit)
*10%, **5%, ***1% significance. Robust standard errors in parentheses
Dep. Var.: Disagree | = 1 if disagreement, = 0 otherwise
Indep. Vars. Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4
T_pressure 1.21*** (0.30) 1.43*** (0.29) 0.56 (0.50) 0.72* (0.54)
Diff_first (DF) 2.04** (1.03) 2.08* (1.33) − 0.16 (1.74) − 0.40 (1.70)
T_pressure * DF – – 3.34* (2.24) 3.57* (2.63)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Constant − 2.08*** (0.37) 1.97 (1.66) − 1.63*** (0.40) 2.70 (1.79)
# of Obs. = 148 Pseudo-R2 = 0.17
Wald-chi2(2) = 16.36
Prob > chi2 = 0.0003
Pseudo-R2 = 0.30
Wald-
chi2(10) = 44.33
Prob > chi2 < 
0.0001
Pseudo-R2 = 0.18
Wald-chi2(3) = 20.96
Prob > chi2 = 0.0001
Pseudo-R2 = 0.31
Wald-
chi2(11) = 47.45
Prob > chi2 < 
0.0001
10 It is worthwhile mentioning that potential endogeneity issues may exist in the analyses reported in 
Table 3. To see whether this is the case, we run endogeneity tests: the null hypothesis of no endogeneity 
is not rejected in either case (Wald test p-values for Specifications 1 and 3 in Table 3 are 0.99 and 0.55).
11 The binary variable takes the value 1 for those bargaining pairs with tension in first proposals higher 
than the median and 0 otherwise. We converted the continuous variable Diff_first into the categorical 
variable Binary_tension due to computational problems caused by using the continuous one.
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by the dependent or independent categorical variables contain very few observa-
tions.12 Estimation results reported in Table A.2.3 provide further support for our 
conclusions.
Result 1 Time pressure increases the frequency and likelihood of disagreements.
Result 2 The effect of time pressure seems to be stronger for those pairs with high 
levels of tension between players’ first proposals.
4.2  Content of agreements
Figure A.1.1 in the Online Appendix shows that high performers’ subjective enti-
tlements are (on average) 0.66 (in both treatments), directly coinciding with the 
induced reference point. In contrast, low performers’ subjective entitlements 
(on average) are around 0.58, the midpoint between 1/2-1/2 and 2/3-1/3. Figure 
A.1.2 shows that high-performers’ first offers bunch around 2/3-1/3 (mean = 0.69, 
median = 0.67) and low-performers’ first offers bunch around 1/2-1/2 (mean = 0.50, 
median = 0.53). Moreover, 28% of a total of 363 offers in HTP are equal to either 
exactly 2/3-1/3 or to the closest prominent numbers around 2/3-1/3 (i.e. the 17,000-
10,000 division of the 27,000 budget), and 17% are equal either exactly to 1/2-1/2 
or to the closest prominent/round numbers around 1/2-1/2 (i.e., the 8,000–7000 
division of 15,000 and the 14,000–13,000 division of 27,000). These percentages 
are 26 and 13% respectively for LTP (of a total of 1032 offers). Subjects’ fairness 
judgments (or entitlement perceptions), first proposals, and the rest of the bargaining 
process were all influenced by the two reference points.
Given these observations, our next look is at bargaining outcomes. The average 
agreed share of winners (conditional on agreement) is 0.59 in LTP and 0.60 in HTP 
(one-sided, MW, p = 0.44; KS, p = 0.49; see Fig. 1).13 Understandably, these num-
bers constitute compromises between players’ first proposals (i.e., 0.50 and 0.69), 
replicating findings from studies with similar designs. In fact, the shares happen to 
be at the midpoint of the range of first offers. Moreover, 103 out of 133 (77%) agree-
ments were in this range (0.50–0.69). On average, time pressure does not have a 
level effect on agreement terms. Even a less ambitious test, where we check whether 
agreements close to 2/3-1/3 are more frequent in HTP does not give a statistically 
significant affirmative answer: 73% (65%) of all agreements in HTP (LTP) are closer 
to 2/3-1/3, but Fisher’s exact and Pearson’s Chi square tests both reject the notion 
that the difference is significant (one-sided, p = 0.219 and 0.331).
Result 3 Conditional on agreements, neither the average winner agreed share nor 
the distribution of winner agreed shares differ between LTP and HTP.
12 See http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata /dae/exlog it.htm for further details.
13 A natural question is whether there is a difference between the agreements across treatments if one 
restricts attention to last-moment (last five seconds) agreements. The mean winner agreed share in such 
agreements is 0.60 in HTP and 0.61 in LTP (two-sided, MW, p = 0.43).
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Table 4 presents the results of (robust) seemingly unrelated bi-probit regressions, 
investigating the effects of time pressure, winner entitlements, loser entitlements, 
interaction variables, and control variables on the probability of reaching 2/3-1/3 
agreements and 1/2-1/2 agreements (conditional on agreement), whereas Table  5 
presents a (robust) OLS regression on winners’ agreed shares.14 In the tables, T_
pressure is a dummy variable taking a value 0 for LTP and 1 for HTP; W_fair and 
L_fair denote winner and loser entitlements, respectively (in the share going to the 
winner) – the two are taken from the question regarding the allocation choice of a 
fair and neutral arbitrator.
In Table  4 (upper panel), Model 1, where the dependent variable is a dummy 
(i.e., Statusquo) showing whether the agreement reached is the 2/3-1/3 division or 
not, the coefficient of T_pressure is positive in all specifications, but significant on 
convention levels only in Specifications 3 and 4. This implies that HTP per se does 
not increase the probability of reaching 2/3-1/3 agreements. In Model 2 (lower panel 
of Table 4), where the dependent variable is a dummy (i.e., Equal) showing whether 
the agreement reached is the 1/2-1/2 division, we see that the coefficient of T_pres-
sure is significant and negative in all specifications. The results imply that HTP 
decreased the probability of reaching 1/2-1/2 agreements.
mean=0.59, sd=0.08 mean=0.60, sd=0.06
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Fig. 1  Distribution of winner agreed shares in LTP and HTP
14 Since whether to agree on 2/3-1/3 division or on 1/2-1/2 divison are decisions likely not to be inde-
pendent, we ran a seemingly unrelated bi-probit regression rather than two separate probit regressions. 
Results from univariate probit regression models are given in the Online Appendix A.2. In short, the two 
sets of results produce very similar results.
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Result 4 Conditional on agreements, time pressure decreases the likelihood of 
reaching agreements on the implicit reference point, i.e., the 1/2-1/2 division. How-
ever, it does not systematically relate to the likelihood of 2/3-1/3 agreements.
Table 4  2/3-1/3 and 1/2-1/2 agreements with time pressure (SU robust bi-probit)
*10%, **5%, ***1% significance. Robust standard errors in parentheses
Model 1. Depend. Var.: Statusquo | = 1 if 2/3-1/3 agreement, = 0 otherwise
Indep. Vars. Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4
 T_pressure 0.06 (0.30) 0.12 (0.31) 8.40** (4.37) 9.96** (4.60)
 W_fair 5.50*** (2.13) 5.66*** (2.15) 6.75** (3.47) 6.72** (3.36)
 L_fair 1.79 (2.39) 1.59 (2.27) 8.29*** (3.18) 9.38*** (3.49)
 T_pressure*W_
fair
– – − 1.48 (5.05) − 1.26 (4.93)
 T_pressure*L_
fair
– – − 12.64*** (4.49) − 15.51*** (4.79)
 Controls No Yes No Yes
 Constant − 5.81*** (2.10) − 7.13*** (2.54) − 10.46*** (3.74) − 13.51*** (4.43)
Model 2. Depend. Var.: Equal | = 1 if 1/2-1/2 agreement, = 0 otherwise
Indep. Vars. Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4
 T_pressure − 0.61* (0.42) − 1.13*** (0.45) − 19.97** (10.98) − 17.83** (10.02)
 W_fair 2.24 (2.31) 0.17 (3.96) − 0.25 (1.96) − 1.40 (3.97)
 L_fair 4.68 (3.84) 4.73 (4.87) 2.48 (3.97) 3.41 (5.09)
 T_pressure*W_fair – – 9.57 (5.97) 9.85 (6.76)
 T_pressure*L_fair – – 19.73* (11.89) 15.41 (11.84)
 Controls No Yes No Yes
 Constant − 5.84** (2.86) − 1.98 (2.98) − 2.94 (2.34) − 0.55 (3.25)
 # of Obs. = 133 Wald-chi2(6) = 15.06
Prob > chi2  = 0.0198
Wald-chi2(22) = 55.18
Prob > chi2  = 0.0001
Wald-chi2(10) = 16.17
Prob > chi2  = 0.095
Wald-chi2(26) = 59.40
Prob > chi2  = 0.0002
Table 5  Agreements and time pressure (Robust OLS)
*10%, **5%, ***1% significance. Robust standard errors in parentheses
Indep. Vars. Dep. Var.: W_agreedshare | winner’s share in the agreement
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4
T_pressure 0.001 (0.12) 0.01 (0.01) 0.29** (0.12) 0.35*** (0.13)
W_fair 0.28*** (0.06) 0.28*** (0.07) 0.36*** (0.08) 0.37*** (0.08)
L_fair 0.10 (0.08) 0.09 (0.08) 0.18** (0.10) 0.19*** (0.10)
T_pressure*W_fair – – − 0.26** (0.12) − 0.30** (0.12)
T_pressure*L_fair – – − 0.20 (0.16) − 0.25 (0.17)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Constant 0.35*** (0.06) 0.35*** (0.10) 0.25*** (0.08) 0.22** (0.11)
# of Obs. = 133 F(3, 129) = 7.40
Prob > F = 0.0001
R2 = 0.08
F(3, 129) = 3.08
Prob > F = 0.0011
R2 = 0.11
F(5, 127) = 5.51
Prob > F = 0.0001
R2 = 0.10
F(13, 119) = 3.24
Prob > F = 0.0003
R2 = 0.14
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Table 5 presents the results of (robust) OLS regressions investigating the effects 
of time pressure, winner entitlements, loser entitlements, and interaction variables 
on winners’ agreed shares, conditional on agreements. We observe that the coef-
ficients of both winners’ and losers’ fairness judgments have the expected posi-
tive sign in all four specifications. W_fair is highly significant in all specifications, 
whereas L_fair is only significant in Specifications 3 and 4. The coefficient of time 
pressure is positive in all specifications but, again, only significant in Specifications 
3 and 4. Thus, winners’ agreed shares appear to be unaffected by the variation in 
time pressure, as already indicated by our non-parametric analysis.
Result 5 Conditional on agreements, time pressure does not influence the share 
winners receive in agreements. The influence of subjects’ fairness judgments (or 
perceived entitlements) on agreements is weaker under time pressure.
4.3  The bargaining process and the timing of agreements
4.3.1  Bargaining process
Since our participants know the deadline before they make their first proposals, the 
latter might have been influenced by the variation in the bargaining deadline, affect-
ing the tension in first proposals. However, the distributions of tension in first pro-
posals (measured in percentage points; i.e., 0.17 means that the sum of what bar-
gainers demand in their first proposals corresponds to 117% of the pie) in LTP and 
HTP do not present evidence for a difference in the tension between first proposals 
(0.19 for LTP and 0.17 for HTP; two-sided MW, p = 0.40; KS, p = 0.61).
First proposals are also potentially informative since impasse may start with a 
specific constellation of initial positions. Figure A.2 in the Online Appendix depicts 
the distribution of winners’ and losers’ first proposals across treatments. It shows 
that the induced reference point outcome, that is the 2/3-1/3 division, is utilized by 
high performers, whereas the implicit reference point outcome, that is the 1/2-1/2 
division, is utilized by low performers in making a first proposal. This is in line with 
Roth’s (1985) argument: “[The] bargainers sought to identify initial bargaining posi-
tions that had some special reason for being credible, and that these credible bar-
gaining positions then served as focal points that influenced the subsequent conduct 
of negotiations [italics in original].” Since 2/3-1/3 and 1/2-1/2 are possibly the two 
most salient (or credible) reference/focal points in our environment, it is natural to 
observe that they influence subjects’ initial bargaining positions.
It is worthwhile re-emphasizing that the differences that we observe in disagree-
ment rates (reported in Sect. 4.1) between LTP and HTP are not due to a prohibi-
tively high level of time pressure. As we reported above, the tension in first pro-
posals (a variable describing an important layer of bargaining) is identical across 
treatments. The frequency of winners (losers) making the opening proposal in a pair 
(i.e., the very first offer in a pair) and the frequency of winners (losers) accepting an 
offer in a pair is also the same in the two treatments (Fisher’s exact tests; p-values 
are 0.71 and 0.56 for winners, and 0.78 and 0.56 for losers). Moreover, the average 
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number of proposals made in a pair is 11.5 in LTP and 5.2 in HTP. Despite the 85% 
reduction in allotted time (i.e. from 600 to 90 s) the number of proposals dropped 
by only 54%. In other words, bargainers in our HTP treatment still found time to 
exchange several proposals.
A look at the distribution of concessions shows that concession behavior looks 
very similar in LTP and HTP. MW tests show that average concessions, defined as 
the difference between what a subject has asked for herself in her first proposal and 
what she agreed to receive at the end (excluding disagreements), are identical across 
LTP and HTP (two-sided, p = 0.29 for winners, p = 0.14 for losers). KS tests deliver 
the same conclusion (two-sided, p = 0.57 for winners, p = 0.54 for losers).
4.3.2  Timing of agreements
The average agreement time in LTP (395 s) is 65.8% of the allotted time (600 s), 
whereas the average agreement time in HTP (78  s) is 86.7% of the allotted time 
(90 s). Table 6 displays the distribution of agreement times (in relation to the total 
time allotted) in LTP and HTP.15 Numbers in the top row refer to the time intervals 
in percentiles (e.g., first 10% of the allotted time and so on), and the numbers in the 
second and third rows refer to the percentage of agreements that occurred in the 
corresponding time interval. These numbers show that the distribution of (relative) 
agreement times in HTP first-order stochastically dominates the ones in LTP. 41% of 
all agreements in LTP are reached in the last 10% of the allotted time (i.e., between 
seconds 541 and 600), whereas 72.90% of all agreements in HTP are reached in the 
last 10% of the allotted time (i.e., between seconds 81 and 90).
Table 7 shows the distribution of last-moment agreements (defined as agreements 
reached in the last 5 s before the deadline), both conditional and unconditional on 
reaching an agreement, across treatments. In the latter, a disagreement is coded as 0 
(i.e., not a last-moment agreement). We observe that 26 pairs (out of 85 that reached 
an agreement; 30.5%) in LTP reach the agreement in the last five seconds, and 24 
pairs (out of 48 that reached an agreement; 50%) in HTP reach the agreement in the 
last 5 s. Both Pearson’s Chi square and Fisher’s exact tests show that the difference 
is significant, in line with Hypothesis 4.
That said, there is another possible definition of last-moment agreements. As it 
can also be seen in Table 7, if one does not take disagreements into account, then 
the percentage of last-moment agreements in LTP is 29.2 and in HTP it is 34.3. The 
difference is in the same direction, but not significant (Pearson’s Chi square test, 
p = 0.49, one-sided Fisher’s Exact test, p = 0.30).
Result 6 Conditional on agreements, the frequency of last-moment agreements is 
higher in HTP than in LTP. Including disagreements in the analysis does not change 
the direction of this result, but renders it statistically insignificant.
15 We also study agreement times in absolute terms, i.e., not as percentages of the allotted time. Figure 
A.1.3 and A.1.4, where we do this, deliver the same message.
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Combined with our findings on first proposals and initial tensions, the similarity 
of concession behavior across treatments hints at the increased disagreement rate 
and last-moment agreement frequency under HTP: if average initial conflict and 
concession behavior are very similar across two situations, but the negotiators have 
only 90 s to strike a deal instead of 10 min, naturally it is likely that they end up in 
stalemates (or reach an agreement in the very last moment).
Table 8 presents the results of (robust) probit regressions, investigating the effects 
of time pressure, tension in first proposals, and the interaction between the two on 
the probability of last-moment agreements (i.e. agreements reached in the last 5 s), 
conditional on agreements.16 In all specifications, the coefficients of time pressure 
and the tension in first proposals are highly significant and have the expected posi-
tive signs.17 
Table 7  Last-moment agreements and time pressure
Conditional on 
agreement
LTP HTP Total Unconditional on 
agreement
LTP HTP Total
0 59 24 83 0 63 46 109
1 26 24 50 1 26 24 50
Total 85 48 133 Total 89 70 159
Pearson’s Chi square test = 0.03
One-sided Fisher’s Exact Test = 0.02
Pearson’s Chi square test = 0.49
One-sided Fisher’s Exact Test = 0.30
Table 8  Last-moment agreements and time pressure (robust probit)
*10%, **5%, ***1% significance. Robust standard errors in parentheses
# of obs. is 124 because Diff_first is not defined for 9 pairs where only one subject made an offer and it 
was accepted
Indep. Vars. Dep. Var.: Last_moment | = 1 if agreed in the last 5 s, = 0 otherwise
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4
T_pressure 0.62*** (0.26) 0.59** (0.27) 0.84** (0.49) 0.87** (0.53)
Diff_first (DF) 3.19*** (1.24) 3.63*** (1.39) 3.61*** (1.38) 4.11*** (1.53)
T_pressure * DF – – − 1.31 (2.77) − 1.64 (3.04)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Constant − 1.08*** (0.28) − 2.23 (1.52) − 1.16*** (0.30) − 2.41 (1.62)
# of Obs. = 124 Wald-chi2(2) = 9.53
Prob  > chi2  = 0.00085
Pseudo-R2 = 0.08
Wald-chi2(10) = 18.54
Prob > chi2  = 0.0465
Pseudo-R2 = 0.15
Wald-chi2(3) =  = 11.72
Prob > chi2  = 0.0084
Pseudo-R2 = 0.08
Wald-chi2(11) = 20.39
Prob > chi2  = 0.0402
Pseudo-R2 = 0.15
16 We also checked for possible endogeneity issues in this analysis. The null hypothesis of no endogene-
ity is not rejected in either case. Corresponding Wald test p-values for Specifications 1 and 3 in Table 8 
are 0.22 and 0.15.
17 The marginal effect of T_pressure is calculated as 0.28, which is significant at the 5% level (see Table 
A.3.6 in the Online Appendix).
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Result 7 Conditional on agreements, time pressure increases the likelihood of last-
moment agreements.
5  Discussion and conclusion
Time pressure and deadlines are important characteristics of many bargaining situa-
tions. To fully understand their impact on bargaining processes and bargaining out-
comes it is important to analyze a bargaining situation that is both rich enough in 
context and structured enough to obtain relevant measures from the process of bar-
gaining. Until now, a study on the effects of deadlines in a rich bargaining context 
was not available in economics. Our setup extends existing results on the effects of 
deadlines and time pressure in structured bargaining games such as the ultimatum 
game.
Our experiment provides a set of relevant results and implications. First, disagree-
ment rates are much higher under high time pressure than under low time pressure. 
The corresponding figures are 31.4 and 4.5%, respectively. The robustness check in 
the form of our treatment with severely high time pressure confirms the general ten-
dency (38%). Obviously, bargaining becomes much more inefficient under high time 
pressure than under low time pressure. This change is not due to physical impos-
sibility of making proposals, i.e. offers and counter-offers. Finally, the influence of 
time pressure (on the likelihood of disagreements) seems to be stronger for those 
pairs with higher levels of tension in first proposals. Conditional on reaching an 
agreement, the deadline effect is much more pronounced under high time pressure 
(50% of agreements are reached in the last 5 s) than under low time pressure (31% 
of agreements are reached in the last 5  s). Both non-parametric tests and regres-
sion analyses provide the same message: time pressure increases the likelihood (or 
frequency) of last-moment agreements, conditional on agreement. That said, if one 
includes disagreements in the analysis, the difference becomes insignificant.
Our preferred interpretation of the stark difference in the frequency of disagree-
ments across treatments runs as follows: in a game with multiple equilibria such as 
ours, the need for coordination devices is stronger under higher time pressure. Our 
setup generates competing coordination devices. Given that winners start bargaining 
with a first offer slightly above 2/3-1/3 and losers start with a first offer of 1/2-1/2, 
and they do not concede faster or more often under high time pressure (compared 
to low time pressure), it is obvious that disproportionately more of them end up 
in bargaining stalemates. One may argue that we implemented a one-shot bargain-
ing problem without any repetition. Bargainers in the high time pressure treatment 
might have underestimated the time required to avoid ultimate conflict and reach an 
agreement, which led to the high disagreement rate. Hence, a question for future 
work is whether the effect we observe survives a repeated design version. It would 
not be too surprising if it turned out that the time pressure effect was strongest when 
subjects are least experienced with bargaining.
Second, the bargaining outcomes in terms of agreements do not differ much between 
different time pressure conditions. However, we observe a lower frequency of the 1/2-
1/2 agreements under time pressure, i.e. time pressure seems to dis-favor the implicit 
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reference point. Observing that under severely high time pressure (i.e., 45 s), average 
winners’ share in agreements is 62% raises the possibility that even more severe time 
pressure may increase the popularity of the explicit reference point—a conjecture that 
needs to be tested in future research. We do not want to over-interpret our result, given 
that we only obtain a significant result for the implicit reference point and not for the 
explicit reference point, but our findings seem to be in line with a stronger status quo 
bias under time pressure. The explicit reference might be more salient than the implicit 
reference point when time is scarce to think about other potential reference points. It is 
relevant to notice that the literature on the effects of time pressure on choosing more 
egoistic or the more altruistic allocations, which is related, is also not fully conclusive.
Third, it is interesting to observe that the nature of the communication, especially 
the content of the chat (see the Online Appendix for details), is very similar across dif-
ferent time pressure conditions. Also, first proposals and the concession behavior do 
not differ significantly.
Our experimental results question the somewhat positive interpretation of time 
pressure in bargaining from social psychology and negotiation science. We show that 
time pressure in bargaining, even if it is not extremely severe, can have huge effects 
on the efficiency of negotiation outcomes. Setting too ambitious deadlines – especially 
in the presence of competing reference or focal points – might thus be dangerous in 
real-world negotiations. Furthermore, our results show that time pressure due to tight 
deadlines may have distributive implications in that they appear to slightly benefit the 
party who is more favored by the precedent. Naturally, there are still open questions 
that call for future research: What if we had varied the salience of different reference 
points by design? Would cognitive load, another aspect that makes decision making 
harder similar to time pressure, lead to comparable results to ours? What would be the 
optimal deadline given the characteristics of the bargaining situation? Ultimately, our 
results and the results from future research have the potential to contribute to a theory 
of bargaining that takes time and thus deadlines explicitly into account.
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